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1. Introduction
Narratives are constructed from a sequence of
events presented in a temporally- and causally-
related manner. More specifically, Labov and
Waletsky (1967) define narratives in terms of refer-
ential and evaluative functions. Referential func-
tions depict events and actions of protagonists in
the story plot, and evaluative functions serve to in-
fer the mental states of protagonists and possible
causal relationships between events. Evaluative
functions in narratives have been examined by
Aksu-Ko and Tekdemir (2004) in relation to how
a protagonist’s false-belief was depicted when nar-
rating a picture storybook, titled Frog, where are
you (Mayer, 1969). This storybook is about a boy
and his dog, who go into the woods to look for
their missing frog. Various aspects of narratives
based on this picture book have been studied exten-
sively (Str mqvist & Verhoeven, 2004). The present
study focused on one of the sub-plots, where the
boy protagonist mistakes a deer’s antlers for a tree
branch. According to Str mqvist and Verhoeven
(2004), this episode involves a specific sub-plot that
places a demand on the narrator’s episotemoloical
operation at an advanced level of theory-of-mind.
In their study, Aksu-Ko and Tekdemir (2004)
maintain that mature narrators make good use of
these functions by adopting the different perspec-
tives of the author and protagonists, and that this
perspective shifting rests on the understanding of
other people’s mental states and connecting causal
links between their beliefs and reality. They exam-
ined how the narrators identify the protagonist’s
misrepresentation based on the same scenes, for de-
velopmental changes and cross-linguistic differ-
ences. They found significant developmental
changes between 3 and 9 year-old children and
adults for the strategies used in the misrepresenta-
tion scenes. However, there was no explicit linguis-
tic statement of the misrepresentation until the
children were 9 years old.
They also examined cross-linguistic differences
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between English and Turkish speakers. Their
analyses of oral narratives found that 73％ of Turk-
ish-speaking and 60％ of English-speaking narra-
tors made explicit references to the protagonist’s
misrepresentation of reality- which was the false
belief. They hypothesised that as Turkish has a spe-
cific verb for encoding misrepresentation, Turkish
narrators would be more likely to depict the mis-
representation linguistically. Although the propor-
tion of narrators who depicted the misrepresenta-
tion is higher for Turkish than for their British
counterparts, this difference was not significant.
The specific linguistic device for encoding false-
belief in Turkish does not appear to facilitate a lin-
guistic mentioning of the misrepresentation.
One of the developments of theory of mind en-
tails the understanding of false-belief that is
achieved by 5-year-olds universally. In this re-
spect, we assume that 5-year-old children can un-
derstand the misrepresentation scenes in this pic-
ture book. However, children did not make refer-
ences to false-beliefs in their narratives until they
were 9 years old. This discrepancy in development
indicates that when telling a story, one needs the
linguistic means to represent what one has per-
ceived.
However, the performance may not just be a mat-
ter of linguistic ability. For example, adults who
have a full-blown theory of mind understanding
also shows limits in their theory-of-mind perform-
ance (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Although the pro-
portion of adults who made explicit references to
the protagonist’s misrepresentation was higher
than for the children, the figures suggest that not
all adults, who are probably well aware of theory-
of-mind (i.e. people can have false beliefs) made ex-
plicit false belief references.
This study examines why a certain proportion
of narrators do not make an explicit reference to
the protagonist’s mental state. Recent research
has shown that there are limits to adults’ theory-
of-mind performance (Keysar, Barr, Balin, &
Brauner, 2000; Keysar et al., 2003), indicating that
an adults’ ability to interpret another’s action
may not manifest itself in their performances.
Keysar et al. claim that the theory of mind is not
fully incorporated into the human comprehension
systems in social communication, even for adults,
suggesting that transforming their reflective abil-
ity to impute their knowledge to another’s sponta-
neously in real-world situations may not always
be reliable.
To better understand this dissociation, a series
of three studies were conducted to try to discover
why some adults do not make explicit mental
state references in narratives with regards to dif-
ferent forms of narrative production and individ-
ual differences in evaluative strategies used in nar-
rating a story.
Study 1 examined oral and written narratives in
Japanese that depicted the same story (the Frog
story) used by Aksu-Ko and Tekdemir. As for the
different representation medium, writing entails
strategies that make explicit connections between
foreground and background information in narra-
tives using lexicalisation and syntactic structures,
whereas speaking relies on context and maximal
meanings and connective relationships between
foreground and background that are implied
rather than stated (Tannen, 1982). Thus it is possi-
ble to assume that narratives in writing and speak-
ing entail different linguistic strategies.
We hypothesised that different methods of pro-
ducing a narrative would place different demands
on the narrators when implicit awareness of false-
belief in cognitive systems are transformed into lin-
guistic forms, such as writing and speaking. This
cognitive load in representing a coherent story
may lead to a difference in the extent to which the
false-belief is depicted linguistically. Thus, we
hypothesised that when the story was depicted in
written narratives, adults maybe more likely to
make linguistic references to the protagonist’s
mental state. In the present study, we examined
narratives produced by female adults, because fe-
males such as mothers tend to be the most studied
group for tasks such as narrating a picture book
for children and were thus regarded as a relevant
population for narrating the Frog Story.
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Study 1
To test the hypothesis that adults are more likely
to make explicit mental state references when the
story was depicted by written narratives, we set
two different tasks. Oral and written narratives of
the picture storybook Frog, where are you (Mayer,
1969), were compared and the proportion of mental
state references to the protagonist’s false-belief in
these narratives were analysed.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
86 adult females participated in this study. 48
university students (Mage＝20.4, SDage＝.67) under-
took the written narrative session, and 20 univer-
sity students (Mage＝21.3, SDage＝.44) and 18 moth-
ers (Mage＝26.3, SDage＝1.88) undertook the oral nar-
rative sessions. The students for both sessions
were recruited from psychology courses and were
given a course credit and the mothers were re-
cruited from mother and toddler groups. They re-
ceived a book token for their participation.
2.2. Procedure
The participants were asked to narrate a story
following the pictures in the storybook Frog,
where are you? They were instructed to construct
a story for children. The written narrative ses-
sions were administered in groups, whereas the
oral sessions took place individually and the oral
narratives were recorded. The instructions were
the same for all sessions. Participants were asked
to look through the pictures of the storybook un-
til they grasped the storyline and to narrate the
story when they were ready. No time constraint
was made. Written narratives took about one
hour, whereas oral narratives took between 10 and
20 minutes. Oral narratives were transcribed prior
to coding.
2.3. Coding
To assess whether a narrative included the pro-
tagonists’ false-belief (FB) references about the
misrepresentation plot, where a boy mistakes a
deer’s antlers for a tree branch, which leads to an
encounter with the deer, references to the follow-
ing were considered (Aksu-Ko & Tekdemir, 2004):
1) tree branch and deer’s antlers, 2) describing the
protagonist’s mental state when mistaking the
deer’s antlers for tree branches by using mental
state terms, such as ‘thought’, ‘surprised’ and
‘mistook’, and other constructions, ‘in fact’ and ‘it
turned out that’; and 3) the unintentional nature
of the boy’s encounter with the deer. Taking ac-
count of these three criteria, a final coding was
made as to whether each narrator made an ex-
plicit reference to the protagonist’s misrepresenta-
tion. Agreements of two independent coders were
98％ for written narratives and 97％ for oral narra-
tives. Any disagreements were resolved by discus-
sion. Examples of explicit references to the protag
onist’s false-belief are as follows:
Example 1 (written narrative with misrepresenta-
tion)
Otokonoko ga sakebuto, fuwarito karada ga uki-
agari, doujini shika ga sugata o arawashi
mashita. Douyara, eda dato omotte-ita no wa
shika no tsuno datta yoodesu.
‘When the boy called out the name of his frog, the
boy was lifted by the deer which had appeared.
What the boy believed to be a tree branch was actu-
ally the deer’s antlers.’
Example 2 (oral narrative with misrepresentation)
Suruto, ki dato omotte-ita mono wa shika no
tsuno deshita.
‘What he thought to be a tree branch was the
deer’s antlers.’
Example 3 (written narrative without misrepresen-
tation)
Kaeru o sagashiteiruno? Totsuzen kikoeta koeni
otokonoko wa bikkuri.
‘Are you looking for a frog? The boy was sur-
prised to hear the deer’s voice.’
Example 4 (oral narrative without misrepresenta-
tion)
Totsuzen shika ga arawarare mashita. ‘Suddenly
a deer appeared.’
3. Results and Discussion for Study 1
The number of narratives that included explicit
references to the protagonist’s false-belief (FB)
was counted (Table 1). 58％ of the written
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narratives, 50％ of the students’ oral narratives
and 33％ of the mothers’ oral narratives, made
explicit references to the false-belief. Although
the proportion of written narratives that made
explicit false-belief references was greater than
those for oral narratives, this difference was not
significant: ÷2 (1)＝2.24, p＞.1. This result was the
same when written and oral narratives were com-
pared for the students’ data only: ÷2 (1)＝0.398,
p＞.1, or compared for the three groups: ÷2 (2)＝
3.29, p＞.1.
These results suggest that the ways of narrat-
ing the story did not make a significant difference
to the proportion of narratives that made explicit
references to the false-belief.
As written and oral narratives differ in the cog-
nitive processing required to representing a story
(Tannen, 1982), it is likely that oral narratives
place a greater demand on the narrator to produce
a coherent story. Thus we hypothesized that oral
narratives, which do not allow as much thinking
time as written narratives, are more likely to omit
the protagonist’s misrepresentation that requires
an interpretation based on a series of scene illustra-
tions given in the picture book. Despite finding no
significant difference, the absolute figure for the
proportion of explicit FB references in written nar-
ratives was higher than for oral narratives. This
may suggest that the difference in task demand
may have affected the performance in depicting
the protagonist’s misrepresentation, and also the
mentalizing process.
Were the people who did not make an explicit
FB reference actually aware of the FB? An ab-
sence of explicit references in the narratives does
not necessarily indicate a failure to understand
the protagonist’s false-belief. As Keysar et al.
(2003) showed, adults often fail to utilize spontane-
ously their fully-fledged theory of mind under-
standing when interpreting actions in social situa-
tions. To clarify the narrators’ mentalizing proc-
ess, it is important to examine the narrators’ inter-
pretation from a different perspective. To examine
the participants’ mentalizing process, Study 2 in-
vestigates the narrators’ implicit level of aware-
ness of the protagonist’s FB through a separate
questionnaire that asks the participants about
their interpretation of the story.
Study 2
Study 2 examined the participants’ interpretation
of the misrepresentation plot, reflectively. This ex-
amination aimed to uncover whether the absence
of explicit references about the protagonist’s false-
belief (FB) in the narratives was due to a lack of
spontaneous interpretation of the protagonist’s
mental state or just a lack of linguistic references
in the narratives. If the narratives that did not
make explicit FB references were due to the narra-
tor’s lack of spontaneous interpretation, then
their responses to interpretation questions would
differ from those narrators who made explicit FB
references.
As Study 1 found no significant differences be-
tween oral and written narratives in relation to ex-
plicit references to the protagonist’s false-beliefs,
the majority of narratives collected in Study 2
were in the written format, which was followed by
a questionnaire, as this was a more efficient
method for collecting a large narrative sample. A
small sample of oral narratives was also obtained
to verify that oral narratives replicated the results
found for the written narratives.
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Table 1. The number of narratives that included explicit FB and no explicit FB references in written
and oral narrative sessions
4. Method
The method for collecting narrative data was
the same as for Study 1, except for the administra-
tion of a questionnaire after the narratives were
collected.
4.1. Participants
112 adult female university students (Mage＝20.2,
SDage＝.57) from a psychology course (N =27) and
early years education course (N =85) who did not
participate in Study 1 were asked to participate in
Study 2. An additional 16 oral narratives were
obtained from psychology students (Mage＝20.00,
SDage＝.36) who did not participate in any of the
previous sessions. All students were given a course
credit for their participation.
4.2. Procedure
Written narrative sessions were conducted using
the same procedures as for Study 1. At the end of
the sessions, the participants were asked about
their interpretation of the scenes in the picture
book. A questionnaire was handed out after the
narratives had been collected so that their answers
to these questions would be based on their interpre-
tation rather than what they wrote. The main pur-
pose of a questionnaire was to check whether or
not the narrator was aware that the protagonist
had mistook the deer’s antlers for tree branches,
without directly asking this question.
There were eight questions in the questionnaire.
In the instructions, the participants were told that
the purpose of the questionnaire was to clarify
their interpretation of the story. There were no
right or wrong answers and they should respond
with yes/no according to their interpretation of
the pictures. Of the eight questions, three were
critical questions related to the misrepresentation
scenes. The other five filler questions were in-
cluded so that the intention of the questionnaire
did not appear to focus specifically on the misrepre-
sentation plot. The key questions for the misrepre-
sentation plot were: CQ1) Was the deer at the
scene when the boy climbed up the hill? CQ2) Did
the boy know that the deer was nearby? ; and
CQ3) Did the boy intend to climb on to the deer’s
head? (see Appendix for all questions). These
questions were used to check that the narrators’ in-
terpretations were in congruent with the knowl-
edge required to make the FB interpretation. To en-
able the FB interpretation, the narrators should
have responded to the critical questions as: 1) the
deer was at the scene when the boy climbed the
hill (YES); 2) the boy did not know that the deer
was nearby (NO); and 3) the boy did not intended
to climb on to the deer’s head (NO).
The narratives were coded in the same way as
for Study 1 to identify an explicit reference to the
protagonist’s false-belief. The agreement between
two independent coders was 89％ for the written
narratives, and 88％ for the oral narratives.
5. Results and discussion for Study 2
Coding of the written narratives for an explicit
reference to the protagonist’s FB revealed that 55
(49％) narratives: 19 (70％) of the psychology stu-
dents, and 36 (42％) of the early years students in-
cluded an explicit FB reference, whereas 57 (51％)
narratives: 8 (30％) for psychology students, and
49 (58％) of the early years students did not in-
clude an explicit reference. The participants’ re-
sponses to the critical questions were analysed.
The proportion of the participant whose answers
indicated that they understood the false-belief in-
terpretation was tabulated in Table 2. As the pro-
portion that made explicit references to the pro-
tagonist’s FB differed significantly across the stu-
dents’ study disciplines: ÷2 (1)＝ 6,44, p＝.011, the
analyses were conducted for each study discipline
group. The number of students that answered all
three critical questions (All CQs) correctly is also
tabulated.
To examine if the participants who made ex-
plicit references to the protagonist’s FB in their
narratives were more likely to answer all three
critical questions in such a way that corresponds
with the FB interpretation, this proportion was
compared between the groups. The chi-square
tests revealed that there were no significant differ-
ences in the responses between those who did and
did not make explicit FB references in their narra-
tives: All participants: ÷2 (1)＝0.88, p＞.1; psychol-
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ogy students: ÷2 (1)＝0.68, p＞.1; and early years
education students: ÷2 (1)＝0.16, p＞.1
These results suggest that the participants were
aware of the protagonists’ false-belief, but did not
always linguistically depict it in their narratives.
To verify whether this finding could be repli-
cated for oral narratives, 16 additional oral narra-
tives were analyzed. The analyses of the oral narra-
tives confirmed that whether or not an explicit FB
reference had been made in the narrative, that this
was independent of the answers to the critical ques-
tions. 68％ of these students made explicit FB refer-
ences in their oral narratives and 32％ did not.
64％ and 60％ respectively correctly answered all
three critical questions: ÷2 (1)＝0.87, p＞.1.
To summarize the present findings, the absence
of linguistic references to the protagonist’s FB did
not indicate an absence of awareness, and this was
independent of the method used to produce the nar-
ratives. These results suggest that even though
adults are generally aware of the protagonist’s
mental states in a story, they do not always make
this explicit using linguistic means. What would
make the adults more likely to make a linguistic
representation of the false-belief? One possibility
is the use of strategies in producing narratives. Al-
though developmental aspects of linguistic strate-
gies in narrating the Frog story have been well re-
ported (Bamberg & Damrad-Frye, 1991; K ntay &
Nakamura, 2004) little is known about the individ-
ual differences in this area for adults. As for the in-
dividual differences it is possible to hypothesize
that the narrators who tend to make linguistic ref-
erences to the mental state of protagonists may be
more likely to depict the protagonist’s FB linguisti-
cally. To test this hypothesis, Study 3 examined
the linguistic strategies used to narrate the entire
Frog Story based on the coding scheme used by
K ntay and Nakamura (2004).
Study 3
This study compared the narrators’ linguistic
strategies in relation to explicit references to the
protagonist’s FB in the key plots. It was antici-
pated that the narrators who made explicit refer-
ences to the protagonist’s FB would tend to use
more linguistic strategies to elaborate on other
events. Particularly, this tendency could lead to
the use of such strategies as frames of mind,
which include expressions of the mental states of
the protagonists in relation to the events.
6. Method
6.1. Participants
Written narratives were obtained from 171 fe-
male university students (Mage＝20.17, SDage＝.80)
from a psychology course (N＝82) and an early
years education course (N＝89). The students were
given a course credit for their participation. The
narratives of 48 psychology students from Study 1
were included to create a balanced sample across
the two study disciplines.
6.2. Procedures
The written narratives were obtained in the
same way as for Study 1. The narratives were
coded for explicit references to the protagonist’
FB and for linguistic strategies that comprised 7
categories based on the work of K ntay and
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Table 2. The proportion of participants who provided responses that matched the false-belief interpretation
Nakamura (2004). These are frames of mind: ex-
pressions of the mental states of the characters;
hedges: linguistic devises used to signify a narra-
tors epistemological state on the true value of the
proposition expressed; negative qualifiers: expres-
sions for a negation of a state or an action that
might arise from the discrepancy between reality
and a narrators’ expectation; character speech: di-
rect statements made in a speech-like form on be-
half of a character; causal connector: use of cer-
tain sentence structures to inform a causal frame-
work between the events in a narrative; enrichment
expressions: adverbial phrases and intensifiers to
elaborate the depiction of state and action; and ono-
matopoeia: a sound symbolic device to indicate the
vividness of sound or movement. Agreement for
coding the explicit references to the protagonist’
FB were 95％. For the linguistic strategies, two
coders coded 25％ of the narratives and Cohen’s
kappa reached .91. Any disagreements were re-
solved by discussion.
7. Results and Discussion for Study 3
The number of narratives that included explicit
references to the protagonist’s false-belief (FB)
was counted for both psychology and early years
education students, and no group difference was
observed: ÷2 (1)＝1.79, p＞.1; 58％ of psychology stu-
dents and 48 ％ of early year education students
made explicit references to the protagonist’s FB.
Frequency measures were used to analyze the lin-
guistic strategies used to narrate the story. The
means and standard deviations for the frequency
of use for the categories of linguistic strategies
were computed (Table 3).
The distribution of data did not meet normality
assumptions. Therefore it was transformed for fur-
ther analyses. A MANOVA was used to examine
the explicit FB references, with the students study
discipline as an independent variable and the fre-
quency of the 7 linguistic strategies as dependent
variables. It showed a significant multivariate ef-
fect for the linguistic strategies as a whole in rela-
tion to the FB reference: Pillai’s Trace (7,
161)＝2.48, p＝.019, partial ç2＝.097 (FB reference
＞no FB reference) and for the students study disci-
pline: Pillai’s Trace (7, 161)＝5.46, p＜.001, partial
ç2＝.19 (psychology＞early years education). There
was no significant interaction between these ef-
fects.
With respect to individual strategy use, the FB
reference effects were found for frames of mind: F
(1, 167)＝4.86, p＝.029, partial ç2＝.028, negative
qualifiers: F (1, 167)＝4.79, p＝.040, partial ç2＝.025,
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Table 3. The means and standard deviations for the frequency of use of the categories of linguistic strategies
causal connectors: F (1, 167)＝12.85, p＜.001, par-
tial ç2＝.071, and enrichment expressions: F (1,
167)＝7.61, p＝.006, partial ç2＝.044. The student’s
study discipline effects were found for frames of
mind: F (1,167)＝5.56, p＝.020, partial ç2＝.032,
negative qualifiers: F (1, 167)＝4.79, p＝.030, par-
tial ç2＝.028, causal connectors: F (1, 167)＝17.43,
p＜.001, partial ç2＝.094, and onomatopoeia: F (1,
167)＝14.30, p＜.001, partial η2＝.079. A signifi-
cant difference in the use of onomatopoeia was
found in the opposite direction (psychology＜early
years education).
These results suggest that those who made ex-
plicit FB references generally used more frames of
mind, negative qualifiers, causal connectors and en-
richment expressions throughout their narratives.
As expected, the linguistic strategies used to nar-
rate the frog story differed in quantity between
the two groups of students with respect to making
explicit FB references.
8. General discussion
The three main findings from this series of stud-
ies are: Firstly, the ways of representing the frog
story, either by writing or speaking, did not sig-
nificantly change the proportion of narratives
that made explicit references to the protagonist’s
false-belief. Secondly, regardless of their linguistic
references to the protagonist’s FB, most of the nar-
rators were implicitly aware of the misrepresenta-
tion scenes when their interpretations were clari-
fied using a reflective questionnaire. And lastly,
those who made explicit FB references also used
significantly more linguistic strategies when nar-
rating the story, in comparison with those people
who did not make explicit FB references.
The lack of differences between written and oral
narratives in relation to the degree to which one
would make explicit FB references may be ex-
plained by a several factors. The first is that the
story narrated in this study may be far too simple
to require differential cognitive demands. The vari-
ous plots in the story involve similar events, such
as searching for the missing frog, and these
events occur repeatedly. This simple structure
might have caused the narrators in both written
and oral formats to perceive each ‘searching scene’
as a routine event. Thus, such simple routine
events in pictures lead to simple representations,
which, resulted in no differential cognitive loads in
narrating the story. Alternatively, given the find-
ing that even the people who did not make explicit
references to the protagonist’s FB were aware of
them when asked in a reflective way using a ques-
tionnaire, the participants who used the written
format also made the assumption that such false-
beliefs can be inferred, as frequently as the oral
narrators (Tannen, 1982), because it is a simple
story. The way of producing narratives may not al-
ways make a significant difference and this differ-
ence may be related to the material to be nar-
rated.
Despite these explanations, why did some people
fail to depict the FB while others succeeded to do
so? A finding of adults’ limit of spontaneous per-
formance in a theory-of-mind task (the so called di-
rector’s task) derived from very simple task that re-
quired an understanding of another person knowl-
edge or false-beliefs. A ‘director’ who could not see
all the objects or options asked the participant
who could see everything to move an object. To
make the correct move the participant needed to un-
derstand the director’s perspective (Keysar et al.,
2000; Keysar et al., 2003). Some of the participants’
omission of explicit FB references in the simple
frog story may be related to Keysar’s findings.
Keysar et al. (2000) argue that people initially use
an egocentric heuristic which involves approaching
a task from their own perspective, and then error
correction takes place based on the mutual knowl-
edge.
In our study, the participants might have failed
to adopt the hypothetical hearer’s (a child’s) per-
spective in transforming their understanding of
the misrepresentation scenes into linguistic repre-
sentations. Because the goal of the present task
was to narrate a story for a child, the extent to
which one makes linguistic representations of
what they understand, whether or not they take ac-
count of the hearer’s perspective was left to the
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participants. However, Keysar’s task had a clear
goal and expectation, yet some adults still failed
to take the director’s perspective. Thus it is not sur-
prising that some people did not make explicit FB
references in the narrative task.
Individual differences in the use of linguistic
strategies in narrating a story could explain
whether or not explicit FB references were made.
The findings from Study 3 indicated clear differ-
ences in linguistic strategies between those who
made clear FB references and those who did not.
People who made clear FB references were more
likely to use linguistic narrative strategies to elabo-
rate a story. Individual differences in strategy use
were also reflected in narrating the target plots in
this study. Addressing whether or not such differ-
ences may be found in narrating other stories is be-
yond the present study; however for this frog
story, individual differences in strategy use is one
of the factors that explain the differences in depict-
ing the protagonist’s FB.
Another factor that might relate to individual
differences is social groups. The findings from
Study 3 indicate that there are differences in lin-
guistic strategy use between the groups of stu-
dents that study different disciplines. This finding
might suggest possible group differences that
could exist in relations to gender, occupation and
possibly interpersonal orientation (e.g. empathy
quotient-systematized quotient: Wakabayashi, A.,
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright (2006)). Albeit
not necessarily mutually exclusive, personal experi-
ences such as reading fictional literature may also
related to individual differences. Reading literary
fiction, which involves a narrator taking a protag
onist’s perspective, has been reported to enhance
the theory of mind performance (Kidd & Castano,
2013), suggesting that individual differences in per-
spective-taking skills is malleable. Further exami-
nation of individual differences in narrators’
evaluative strategies could provide a new window
into understanding the relationship between lin-
guistic representations of mind and mentalizing
ability in adulthood.
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Appendix
Please provide your interpretation of the Frog
story by answering (yes/no) to the following ques-
tions.
1. In the morning, was the boy surprised to find
out that his frog had disappeared from the
jar?
2. Did the boy know where the frog had gone?
3. Did the boy want to ask a mole where his frog
was?
4. Was the deer at the scene when the boy
climbed up the hill?
5. Did the boy know that the deer was nearby?
6. Did the boy intend to climb on to the deer’s
head?
7. Did the boy take his frog back home?
8. Did the boy take a different frog back home?
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Frog Storyの語りにみられる誤信念の描写
―語り手が用いた評価方略の分析―
学芸学部 心理学科
辻 弘美
要 旨
3つの研究において、Frog Storyの語り手が用いた語りの評価方略を心的状態語への言及に注目し
て分析した。研究 1では、書き言葉と話し言葉の 2つのフォーマットによって産出された語りを分
析し、誤信念への言及の割合を比較したところ、書き言葉・話し言葉・話し言葉によって誤信念へ
の言及は異ならないことが明らかとなった。研究 2では、語りの直後に、語り手が主人公の誤信念
に気づいていたかを確認する質問への回答をもとめたところ、語り手は、主人公の誤信念に気付い
ていたにもかかわらず、語りにおいて、明確な言語表現を用いなかったことが明らかとなった。研
究 3では、語りにおいて主人公の誤信念への言及を行なった語り手とそうしなかった語り手の語り
に用いた評価方略の比較をしたところ、誤信念を言及した語り手グループは、語り全般において、
心的状態語を頻繁に用いることが明らかとなった。
キーワード：心の理論、ナラティブ、Frog Story、日本語、心的状態語
